Interchange: Bidding for Green Lights by Shantharam, Nitin et al.
flickr: stuckincustoms/5069047950
Interchange:
Bidding for Green Lights
Nitin Shantharam ➔UC Irvine
Thomas Strang ➔DLR
Donald J. Patterson UC Irvine ➔
In urban environments great effort is directed 
toward alleviating traffic including the design 
and implementation of complex software and 
hardware infrastructure. We introduce the 
idea of an auction-based mechanism for 
resolving vehicle intersections using a multi-
way group auction mechanism. We propose a 
supporting infrastructure that has promise for 
increasing performance and responsiveness 
to dynamic traffic conditions. In order to 
evaluate new intersections, we propose new 
metrics that attempt to capture a more human 
aspect of vehicular transportation. We 
demonstrate that Interchange intersections 
perform well in single and multi-grid 
configurations, are self-adapting and are 
responsive to a variety of traffic loads.
• Participants have a dashboard 
User Interface
• specifying navigation
• specifying price point
•[$0.00 - $1.00]
•pay to turn light green
• connected to network
• “Interchange” manages 
intersections
• using auction mechanics
• aggregates bids from many 
drivers
• selects light patterns that
•are safe
•maximize accepted bids
Abstract
• Graceful adoption
• Not all driver’s must participate
• Not all intersections must be supportive
• Robust to failure
• Naturally degrades to loop sensors
• Simple timers
• Does not require global coordination
• Driver’s route must be known 
• Solo cars on roads always get green lights 
for free
• Rushed drivers can pay for green lights
• Cost-sensitive drivers travel in packs
• Ambulances can be given infinite bids
• Instead of money, “credits” could be used 
that are issued based on environmental 
impact of vehicle
• Auction losers can receive winners credits
• Trade off waiting now for priority later
• Sponsors could pay to supplement bids for
• turns into drive-thru’s
• increased response after public events
• Credits could be traded on a secondary 
market
• Buses and carpools could multiply their bid 
by the number of passengers
ImplicationsThe PrEMISE
MODELING
When vehicles approach within 10sec
(distance varies based on vehicle speed) of
an intersection, i, on a route in which they
are being confronted with a red light they
make a bid via Interchange for a green
light and begin decelerating to a stop. A
bid is formally a 3-tuple, b = {o, d, v}, spec-
ifying the lane of origin, o 2 Oi, the des-
tination lane, d 2 Di, and a bid value
v 2 [$0.00 $1.00]. A vehicle may only bid
once per intersection. Interchange main-
tains a database of bids and first, aggre-
gates across those that begin and end in
the same lanes, Bo,d =
P
b | b.o=o,b.d=d(b.v).
Each intersection, based on the lane and
road configuration, has a set of tra c pat-
terns, P¯ , that when followed, would not
result in collisions. Each pattern, p 2 P¯ ,
allows multiple simultaneous non-colliding
transitions of the form o ! d. As time
progresses Interchange monitors the ag-
gregation of bids, B¯, and then further ag-
gregates for each p, the total bid for a light
pattern: Tp =
P
(o,d)2p(Bo,d).
When any pattern bid, Tp, becomes
higher than that of the current winning
pattern the lights switch to the pattern
with the new highest bid, with yellow lights
assigned to lanes whose setting is chang-
ing from green to red. Bids from slowing
and stopped cars are only subtracted from
the aggregates as they leave the intersec-
tion, not when the lights switch. After a
light change, the second highest bid at the
time of the last pattern switch was T 0p. In-
dividuals that benefit from the switch are
charged the equivalent proportion of T 0p
that they bidded for in Tp. This is consis-
tent with the lowest price that could have
been o↵ered to win the auction. Vehicles
that pass through the green light after the
auction resolution are not charged. Addi-
tionally, appropriate minimum switching
times are enforced.
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